Odisha train tragedy: Probe finds major lapses in signalling-circuit alteration
A high-level investigation determined that "wrong signalling" was the primary cause of the triple train accident on June 2 at Bahanaga Bazar station in Odisha's Balasore district, which claimed 293 lives.
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Bhubaneswar: A high-level investigation determined that "wrong signalling" was the primary cause of the triple train accident on June 2 at Bahanaga Bazar station in Odisha's Balasore district, which claimed 293 lives.
The faulty signalling was attributed to two botched repair works, one in 2018 and the other hours before the accident, which sent Coromandel Express on a collision course with a goods train on another track, according to the independent inquiry report submitted to the Railway Board by the Commission of Railway Safety (CRS).
It attributed the mishap to human error during the five-year replacement of an electric lifting barrier (ELB) for level crossing (LC) gate 94 at the station.
While citing "lapses at multiple levels" in the signalling and telecommunications (S&T) department, it also stated that the June 2 tragedy could have been avoided had the repeated glitches with the local signalling system been flagged, allowing the signalling and track staff to trace the mistake made in 2018.
According to the report, the station-specific approved circuit diagram was not provided for repair work near the accident site, which was a "wrong step that led to wrong wiring," and that a team of field supervisors modified the wiring diagram but failed to replicate it. The change in names made during the 2018 relocation was not reflected in the cabin's wiring diagram.
While the train crashed around 6.55 p.m., a team of four - senior section engineer (SSE-signal) Amir Khan, technician (of Bahanaga) Abinash Ranjan Mohanty, technician (Balasore) Pappu Kumar, and SSE signal in-charge AK Mahanta - replaced a similar circuit in the same cabin between 4.20 p.m. and 4.50 p.m. "Due to the mistakes made in 2018, the team disconnected the incorrect wires for the new repair work." They rewired for the new ELB, unaware of the lapses. During this time, the team disconnected the feed from the cross over 17A/B to the point detection relay circuit and replaced it with another circuit. "To accomplish this, the crossover indication feed was disconnected from the status of the track point at the site," according to the report.
Though the Coromandel Express was given a signal for the Up mainline, the track point was discovered to be set for the Up loop line, which is why the train moved on the loop line and derailed after colliding with a stationary goods train, according to the report.
"The accident occurred when 12841 Shalimar-Chennai Coromandel Express rear-ended a goods train on the station's up loop line." The last two coaches of train no. 12864 SMVT Bengaluru-Howrah Express, which were passing on the station's down main line, were hit and overturned by the derailed coaches of train no. 12841.
The rear collision occurred as a result of lapses in previous signaling-circuit modifications performed at the North Signal Goomty, as well as during the execution of signaling work related to the replacement of the 'electric lifting barrier' for level-crossing gate no.94 at the station.
These lapses resulted in incorrect signaling to train 12841, as a result of which the up home signal indicated green for the train's run-through movement on the station's up main line. However, the crossover (crossover 17 A/B) connecting the up main line to the up loopline was set to the up loopline. The incorrect signaling resulted in 12841 traversing the up loop line and eventually colliding with the goods train that was standing there."
It also mentioned a similar incident of a mismatch between the intended route set by signals and the actual route taken by a train on May 16, 2022 at Bankranayabaz station in Khargpur Division of South Eastern Railway due to incorrect wiring and cable fault on May 16, 2022.
The CRS report also stated that any changes to signaling circuits should be made with an approved circuit diagram and in the presence of an officer. Before restoration or reconnection work, a separate team should be deployed to check and test modified signaling circuits and functions.
If both 'Normal' and 'Reverse' indication relays are detected for a point, all signal movement over that point should be prohibited. This should be registered as a fault condition in the case of Electronic Interlocking, and the system should shut down automatically. If the status of a point indication relay (physical relay) is 'Normal,' the command for changing the point's operation from 'Reverse' to 'Normal' should not be generated, and vice versa.
The report recommended that a drive be launched to update the completion signalling wiring diagrams, other documents, and signaling circuit lettering on-site. It also stated that the initial response to such a disaster should be faster, and it advised the Railways to review the disaster-response system in the zonal railways, as well as the coordination between the zonal railways and various disaster-response forces such as NDRF and SDRF.
Notably, in its most recent audit, the CAG identified serious safety issues caused by a lack of inspections and track maintenance in East Coast Railway (ECoR), which oversees rail operations in Odisha. Rashtriya Rail Sanraksha Kosh, a special fund established in 2017 to improve railway safety, was allegedly misused to purchase furniture, utensils, crockery, computers and printers, foot massagers, and develop passenger amenities such as lifts and escalators, in addition to works in staff quarters and officers rest house.
